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Gruen Nation: Dissecting the show, not the business 
Abstract 
One distinctive feature of the increasing mediatisation of politics in general and election 
campaigns in particular is the growth of the media’s self-referential reflections on the interplay 
between politics and media. This meta-coverage has become a familiar media ritual that is not 
only evident in traditional ‘hard news’ media, but has also become an essential part of comedy 
and lifestyle programs. While some scholars argue that these self-referential revelations about 
how political communication and audiences are being conceptualised serves the public interest, 
others suggest that meta-coverage leads to increased cynicism and disengagement among 
citizens. In this context, the highly successful Australian television program Gruen Nation is a 
particularly instructive example. On the program, advertisers and campaign strategists engaged 
in meta-coverage of the 2010 Australian Federal Election campaign. This article examines how 
the communication experts decoded political communication, how they performed their 
professional ideology and to what extent their meta-coverage contributed to a critical analysis 
of the interplay between media and the democratic process.  
Keywords: Political advertising, meta-coverage, entertainment, television 
Introduction 
Welcome to Gruen Nation, where, for the next four weeks, we’re gonna strap on 
lead vests and run the election under an X-ray. You won’t find any policy talk 
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here. We are only interested in the way the big four brands—Labor, Liberal, 
National and Green—try to get you to buy them. (Wil Anderson’s opening 
statement on Gruen Nation) 
Gruen Nation attracted up to 1.6 million weekly viewers on Australian public broadcaster ABC 
television during the 2010 Australian Federal Election campaign. It was the ABC’s highest rating 
program in 2010. With Gruen Nation, the ABC continued its record of producing popular 
broadcast coverage of elections—Gruen Nation out-rated any other election coverage on 
Australian television. The program was an extension of The Gruen Transfer (2008–2011), a 
popular show featuring a panel of advertising professionals discussing and decoding 
advertising. Gruen Nation featured a panel of communication experts: advertising professionals 
Todd Sampson and Russel Howcroft, political campaign strategist Neil Lawrence, former 
Federal politician John Hewson and political commentator Annabel Crabb. The show was hosted 
by comedian and political satirist Wil Anderson, his role on the show being to introduce 
discussion, prompt laughter and respond with pithy and probing one-liners. Each segment was 
framed with a scripted introduction and question from Anderson to a panellist. In this article, 
we are primarily interested in the practices of the panellists. 
Gruen Nation can be placed within the emergence of forms of political communication 
that hybridise formerly distinct genres (news, editorial, satire and entertainment).1 These forms 
of political communication are novel in their concern with the decoding of the political process 
and their plain language explanation of political strategies to the ‘ordinary’ citizen. Gruen Nation 
presented itself as a ‘national bullshit detector’ that would ‘X-ray’ the ‘show business’ of 
politics.2 To detect and debunk ‘bullshit’ in Australian culture is a ‘good’ thing. It suggests not 




Furthermore, Anderson’s opening statement, and promotional press for the program, 
presented the exposure and decoding of politics as procedures that act in the public interest. 
Within the broadcast landscape, Gruen Nation was distinctive in its focus on political advertising 
and communication, rather than political news and journalism. It directed attention towards 
advertising as a central element of contemporary political communication and was promoted as 
enabling the public to examine their place in the political process by understanding how 
professional communicators conceptualise them. Jon Casimir, Gruen Nation’s producer, said of 
the program, ‘we’re making a show about how people are understood. And for the person on the 
couch, that’s a scenario where they get to recognise themselves and their own behaviours, and 
their own thoughts’ (interview on Mumbrella 2010). As a program produced by Australia’s 
publicly funded broadcaster, the ABC, these claims deserve critical attention.  
The development of such hugely popular satirical forms of meta-coverage by a public 
broadcaster is intriguing, as they face the challenge of producing content that is both popular 
and contributes to improving the quality of participation in the democratic life of the nation. 
With this in mind, it is important to consider what the national broadcaster’s investment in such 
forms of meta-coverage contributes to a changing media-political process. 
To this end, in this article we set out to examine Gruen Nation in three ways. Firstly, we 
examine how professional communicators on the program use their professional frameworks 
and identity to decode political communication. We ask: How do advertisers perform their 
professional ideology (Deuze 2006) on Gruen Nation?3 And, what kind of understanding of, and 
participation in, the political process does their insight offer? Secondly, by analysing ‘The Pitch’, 
a segment on the program where advertising agencies pitch political advertisements to the 
panel, we explore advertisers’ attempts to use their professional practices and frameworks to 
construct ‘better’ forms of political communication: How are The Pitch advertisements better, 
and do the proposed advertisements allow the audience to imagine better forms of political 
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communication? Finally, we place Gruen Nation within the growing emphasis on meta-coverage 
in the media-political process: Does meta-coverage by advertisers on Gruen Nation represent a 
critical engagement with political communication practices? 
Learning to laugh at meta-coverage 
A feature of the increasing ‘mediatisation’ (Louw 2010; McNair 2011) of the political process is 
the growth of meta-coverage. Meta-coverage is characterised by the media’s self-referential 
reflections on the interplay between politics and media (Esser, Reinemann & Fan 2011; 
deVreese & Elenbaas 2008). The emphasis of this coverage is on the revelation and explanation 
of backstage interactions and strategies deployed by politicians and their advisors when dealing 
with the media. Sally Young (2011, p. 182) chronicled the practice of meta-coverage in her 
analysis of Australian elections. She found that 
stories that were mainly about policies… declined by 60 per cent between 2001 
and 2007. Stories that had no, or negligible, reference to policy rose by an almost 
equivalent amount of 54 per cent. When a policy proposal was reported, the 
focus was usually on its relevance to the horse-race rather than its finer detail or 
whether it would solve the problem identified.   
Much of the conceptualisation of meta-coverage has focused on traditional ‘news’ media. 
We propose that meta-coverage is a now familiar media ritual evident in the practices of 
journalism but also more widely found in popular and political culture. Celebrity and political 
confessions, reality TV’s self-referential exposure of its own means of production and backstage 
machinations (Andrejevic 2004), and corporate brands’ references to the instrumental nature of 
their own appeals (Holt 2002) are all suggestive of a growing media culture that reflects on the 
constructed nature of media representations.  
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In Australia, the past two federal elections have been marked by the use of social media, 
irreverent viral advertising, and appearances by political leaders on lifestyle, comedy and 
entertainment programs. A preoccupation of these hybridised forms of political communication 
is the ‘debunking’ and ‘revealing’ of the backstage process, motivations, and ‘real’ beliefs of 
politicians and their parties. In the United States, political satirists have emerged on comedy 
news programs like The Daily Show as a new class of generators of meta-coverage; they offer an 
explanation and exposure of the political process that their audiences take to be credible (Baym 
2005; Feldman 2008). Similarly, in Australia, Gruen Nation’s advertising and political 
communications professionals emerge as a distinct group engaged in the production of meta-
coverage.  
Accounts differ on the impact of this growth of meta-coverage on the democratic 
process. Some argue that it provides citizens with important and enlightening information 
about how political communication works (McNair 2011). From this perspective, media 
concerned with ‘exposing’ the inner workings of the political process prompts politicians 
towards democratically desirable principles and practices of communication (Esser & D’Angelo 
2006). In contrast, critical accounts suggest that meta-coverage impels citizens to become 
increasingly cynical and disengaged from the democratic process (Kerbel 1999; deVreese 2005; 
Louw 2010).  
Some scholars have argued that the integration of the political process with comedy, 
popular and celebrity culture democratises politics and enables citizens to understand complex 
political issues (Temple 2006; van Zoonen 1998; Scammell 1995). These accounts suggest that 
the satirical debunking of the political process reinvents political journalism by opening up new 
forms of critical enquiry and engaging an estranged audience of mostly younger citizens in the 
democratic process (Baym 2005; Feldman 2008). Greg Baym (2005) praises The Daily Show for 
advocating a ‘conversational or deliberative theory of democracy’ where ‘only open 
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conversation can provide legitimate foundation for governance’. In contrast, critics (for 
instance, Postman [1987], Andrejevic [2007] and Marshall [1997]) argue that the savvy attitude 
invoked by decoding, debunking, backstage revelations, confessions and exposing production 
only stimulates a ‘critical apathy’ that directs the public away from ‘imagining alternatives’ 
(Teurling 2010, p. 370).4 
Within the context of increasing meta-coverage and debate about its impact on the 
political process, we examine what useful contribution Gruen Nation, as a program funded by 
the public broadcaster, made to the election coverage. Our strategy is to examine how the 
professional communicators on the program offered their expertise as a framework for the 
public to understand political communication. 
The Advertising Professional as ‘Bullshit Detection Expert’ 
In the following sections we analyse interactions between panel members on Gruen Nation. The 
program consisted of four weekly episodes throughout the formal election campaign. We focus 
specifically on the parts of the program that invested in a considered analysis of that week’s 
political advertising and communication strategies.  
Gruen Nation enables us to examine advertising professionals’ public performance of 
their professional ideology. The program offers a unique avenue for contributing to accounts of 
how communication professionals give meaning and legitimacy to their work (for instance, 
Carpentier [2005], Deuze [2006], Hackley and Kover [2007], Hesmondhalgh [2010], Pieczka 
[2002] and Svensson [2007]). In the analysis, we set out to elaborate on the frameworks 
employed to evaluate political advertising.  
Throughout the program, panellists’ analyses of advertising implicitly drew on 
managerial criteria that are evident in advertising practices and frameworks (see, among 
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others, Wells [2011], Duncan [2005] and Hackley [2010]), and industry awards recognising 
outstanding performance in creative excellence.5 On Gruen Nation, advertising and professional 
communicators applied some combination of the following managerial criteria to an analysis of 
the political process and an evaluation of ‘good’ political advertising:  
a) Advertising strategy: the soundness of the strategic advertising concept in terms of choice of 
target audience, persuasion strategy and strategic fit into the overall campaign.  
b) Creative idea: originality of the creative concept and the communication idea.  
c) Creative execution: originality and quality of the design and production of the 
advertisements.  
d) Use of media: originality and effectiveness of the chosen media in terms of target audience.  
e) Evaluation of effectiveness: overall effectiveness of advertisement and campaign against the 
set objectives.  
In the following section, we consider how panellists deployed communicative capacities 
such as intuition, judgment, deliberation and explanation to ‘decode’ political communication 
for the public. In the analysis of Gruen Nation to follow, three practices become evident.  
Firstly, panellists draw attention to the constructed nature of the media-political 
process. In particular, they explain how emotional or affective appeals are incorporated into 
political communication.  
Secondly, panellists theorise and explain communication strategies using advertising 
frameworks. In their account, advertising is presented as a legitimate framework for 
representing and understanding the political process. In broad terms, panellists allude to a 
larger critique of the manipulative and promotional nature of the media-political process but 
specific advertisements are only evaluated using strategic frames (for instance, effectiveness or 
creativity). Advertising professionals focus on the creative aspects of the discussed 
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advertisements rather than an analysis of advertising in the political process. This happens even 
in cases where they express concerns about the tactics used. For example, the panel criticised 
negative campaigning in general before celebrating the creative excellence and strategic 
cleverness of specific negative advertisements.  
Thirdly, panellists deploy advertising frameworks as a method for enjoying being 
knowledgeable about the political process. Simply understanding the constructed nature of 
political communication (‘detecting bullshit’) is presented as empowering in its own right. The 
panellists invite the audience to enjoy being knowledgeable, distanced and exempt observers of 
an instrumental communicative process. In each of these activities the professionals on the 
panel draw on affective communicative capacities and legitimacy embodied in their professional 
identity.6 The audience are invited to find panellists credible by virtue of their professional 
experience. 
 ‘You’re Soaking in it’: Decoding Political Communication 
On the first episode of Gruen Nation, advertising creative Todd Sampson said of the incumbent 
Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s opening campaign advertisement:  
The challenge with any political advertising is the products we’re selling can 
talk. And the more they talk the more we need advertising to kind of shape and 
massage and kind of put their image together. And in this case she’s using a 
controlled environment to come across as very competent. And really, in 
political advertising it’s not about whether you are competent—it’s about 
whether you can be competent on television.  
Sampson’s analysis illustrated two components of professional communicators’ analysis 
of political communication on Gruen Nation. Firstly, panellists claim that ‘good’ political 
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advertising is strategically effective where it appeals to our emotive or intuitive assessments of 
how a person ‘comes across’. For the advertising professional, evaluating the appearance of a 
leader (as Sampson explains ‘whether you can be competent on television’) is more important 
than the substance of the ideas communicated. Secondly, panellists suggest that the role of 
professional communicators is to create and manage ‘controlled environments’ that shape and 
modulate the ‘image’ of a leader. Sampson’s frame was repeated by the panel throughout their 
analysis of the election campaign to address the key strategic problem of making a political 
leader believable. 
In the same episode, the panel discussed the symbolic gestures or ‘stunts’ politicians 
perform to attract media attention. When prompted for his opinion of media stunts like signing 
promises or pledges on television, former politician John Hewson garnered laughter and 
applause when he said, ‘it’s basically bullshit’. The panel and audience repeatedly laughed at 
and applauded statements that denoted politicians and their communications as ‘bullshit’. This 
practice suggested a cynical enjoyment of the contrived nature of political communication 
strategies. Laughter is significant here; it acts as a method of clarifying the intentions within this 
social interaction by negotiating its meaning.  Laughter functions as a way of indicating insider 
status. The audience, the panel and the viewers at home reveal their special status as an in-
group who ‘know’ by communally acknowledging that they too are smart enough to see through 
the political talk, labelled here as ‘bullshit’. ‘We’ laugh because ‘we’ see through the constructed 
nature of double-speak, even though others may not. But laughter that functions primarily to 
designate an in-group may ‘fail politically’ to prompt action, mark out an alternate vision or 
enable dialogue between different positions (Truscello 2011, p. 138). While laughing indicates a 
savvy and knowing disposition, as opposed to being gullible or naive, it does not necessarily 
translate into empowerment, action or critical engagement (Teurling 2010, p. 368).  
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John Hewson and former political strategist Neil Lawrence both pointed to the problem 
of an audience made aware of the constructed nature of media representations.  
John Hewson: It’s hard to prove that you should be believed these days. I mean 
people just do not believe political leaders anyway. So you go to extreme lengths 
to say, ‘look I can be believed, look I’ll even sign it, I’ll put…’ and everyone says, 
‘so what?’ 
Neil Lawrence: I believe you even less. 
John Hewson: I believe you even less.  
In Hewson’s account, the political leader undertakes ever more conspicuous attempts to 
be believed and, in doing so, further erodes the credibility of what they say. Hewson’s lament 
pointed at a larger social critique of a political communication process that inhibits debate and 
engagement with ideas. The panel, though, moved on to explain how political communication is 
strategised in such a system. That strategic challenge was not placed in larger critical or social 
terms. Advertising professional Russel Howcroft then commented on John Hewson’s story about 
a pledge he signed during an election campaign: 
Russel Howcroft: This is all about the media cycle though isn’t it? It’s the 
pressure to give the media a picture, yeah? And the picture has got to be as big as 
you can. The signature has got to be as big as you can possibly make it. You try 
and do a stunt, you’re trying to get on the front page of the newspaper.  
Neil Lawrence: But it always ends up looking amateur, and I’ve never seen it 
work, it’s actually usually been quite damaging. 
To Howcroft and Lawrence, Hewson’s story was a strategic lesson in how to craft 
political messages for a public grown savvy to the contrived nature of political campaigning. As 
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advertising professionals, their interest was in how these gestures can be crafted so that they 
are effective in capturing the public’s attention or making a leader appear credible. The two 
advertising professionals were not interested in Hewson’s view about the impact of these 
practices on the political process.  
The problem of being believed was elaborated on throughout the program, with 
reference to aspects of political communication that are less about the public’s engagement with 
a particular idea and more about their emotional or intuitive engagement with a political 
leader’s tone of voice, gestures or the medium in which they appear. The panel discussed Julia 
Gillard’s attempts to ‘modulate’ her tone of voice. Howcroft explained that ‘brands have a tone 
of voice’ and was concerned that changing Gillard’s tone would dilute an aspect of what makes 
her ‘different’. Lawrence countered Howcroft by explaining that Labor strategists think a more 
feminine tone is a ‘key selling point’ against Liberal Opposition Leader Tony Abbott’s male 
aggression. In a discussion about the televised Leader’s debate, Todd Sampson drew attention 
to Gillard’s body language and explained that her repeated display of her palms was an attempt 
to conjure trust with the public. He explained that anyone who had ‘done body language 
courses’ and ‘knew’ body language would find it ‘irritating’. In each of these discussions the 
professional communicators on the panel drew on their professional expertise to make 
judgments and explanations about affective aspects of communication. As advertisers, they 
judged the strategic effectiveness of political communication by evaluating its emotive and 
intuitive appeals.  
The panel also drew attention to how a medium can be used to modulate and manage 
the public’s intuitive or affective response to a candidate. In these explanations the leader is 
communicated by a particular medium. The emphasis is not on any particular meaning a leader 
or their campaign constructs, but instead on how advertisers and political communicators 
position the leader within a certain ‘affective background’ (Clough 2008) provided by a specific 
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television, radio or online format. Anderson introduced the discussion with a summary of recent 
attempts by politicians to appear in popular culture, lifestyle and entertainment formats:  
Wil Anderson: Now, Neil, you put Kevin Rudd on a bunch of FM breakfast shows, 
you put him on Rove, are there risks involved in that?  
Neil Lawrence: There’s always risks in anything live. If you look at Kevin going 
on Rove, there’s a few reasons for doing it. It’s a good environment. He could talk 
to—reach—an audience it’s difficult to get to through normal political 
advertising. Also, there’s maybe this judgment that he’s such an uber-nerd that 
it’s maybe cool in its own way and would maybe work in the show.  
[An excerpt from Rudd’s appearance on Rove is screened] 
Neil Lawrence: There’s one other reason for doing that in the serious part of the 
campaign. Even though it’s Rove and it’s live entertainment, it’s all serious 
business. And, the great differentiation in that campaign, the fundamental 
strategy, was about the Labor party being the future, and the Howard 
government being the past. John Howard couldn’t have gone on Rove, and 
wouldn’t have gone, if he tried it would’ve been a disaster.  
Lawrence demonstrated how the key differentiation in the campaign was the ability of 
the leaders to operate within a particular medium. John Howard, as an older conservative 
politician more comfortable in traditional radio talkback or journalistic television interviews, 
couldn’t appear believable within the popular media that Rudd could use. Rudd’s presence in 
those media communicated a generalised set of meanings and embedded Rudd within an 
environment that wasn’t accessible to Howard. To the panellists, the success of the strategy 
wasn’t about Rudd’s particular ideas or policies. Instead, the panel celebrated a political 




The opportunity presented by the panel was to identify with the panellists’ ability to 
discern how tone of voice, body language or a particular medium are used to make a leader 
appear credible. The exposition of politicians’ staged attempts to conjure trust with the public 
arguably helps people ‘see through’ politicians’ attempts to manipulate their feelings and 
judgments. As the program’s producer, Jon Casimir, put it, this activity develops a critical media 
literacy that helps the public understand how the political process ‘understands them’. 
Importantly, this ritual of exposure also constructs the advertising professional as an expert 
who, by virtue of their professional identity, expertise and experience, can offer visceral insight 
into how political communication works. In this sense, the panellists are affective labourers who 
draw on their ‘linguistic, communicative, or intellectual capacities’ and their place in the social 
body (Clough et al. 2007, p. 71) to explain how political communication works. They do the 
work of making advertising expertise a legitimate part of understanding and engaging with 
political communication. They invite the audience to trust their expertise and deploy it to make 
similar assessments of political candidates and their communication strategies. This activity 
constructs and promotes savvy and cynical forms of political participation as much as it decodes 
and pre-empts them (Andrejevic 2010; Massumi 2005). 
In these forms of political communication, both communications professionals and the 
public are more concerned with how messages are formed and presented than what those 
messages are. The impasse this creates is that the beliefs of the public matter only in so far as 
they can be aggregated, catalogued and analysed for the purpose of creating instrumentally 
effective communications. The advertising and political communications professionals on Gruen 
Nation contributed to the normalisation of a media–political process that, following Clough 
(2008) and Dean (2010), focuses not on the substance of particular demands the public make 
but on how those demands can be ‘modulated’ (Clough 2008, p. 16). Furthermore, they invite 
the public to enjoy identifying with the insiders who ‘get’ and can discern the constructed 
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character of political communication (a practice Andrejevic [2008] also observes in his study of 
Television Without Pity).  
While the public’s judgement about politicians will always be in part affective (Street 
2004), Gruen Nation appears to amplify the importance of making intuitive judgments about the 
constructed affective appeals of political communication. Since the 1970s, advertising has 
developed strategies based around emotional, associational and cultural appeals. On Gruen 
Nation, advertisers deployed criteria of effectiveness, media use and creativity associated with 
these strategies to evaluate political communication. The implicit appeal to a well-informed 
public is to understand how purposive communication attempts to manipulate them. The 
paradox here is that advertising works regardless of how audiences or publics understand it. 
Arguably, these rituals of deconstruction do not prompt more imaginative or constructive forms 
of political participation; instead they amplify cynical distance and critical apathy (Andrejevic 
2009; Teurling 2010). Where these critical accounts claim that ideology can be exposed without 
ceasing to function (Andrejevic 2004), advertising industry narratives provide a corresponding 
reference point. Advertisers readily acknowledge that advertising works on an affective or 
emotive level and that exposing how it works doesn’t make it any less effective. In the next 
section we consider Gruen Nation’s attempt to go beyond deconstruction to construct ‘better’ 
forms of political communication.  
‘The Pitch’: Constructing ‘Better’ Political Communication  
‘The Pitch’ segment of the show demonstrated how advertising professionals envision ‘better’ 
forms of political advertising. In the first episode of Gruen Nation, Russel Howcroft described 
political advertisements as ‘ordinary compared to great brand communication’. Given the 
ambivalence of advertising professionals to political advertisements (Scammel & Langer 2006) 
it is instructive to examine how the panellists evaluated the advertisements presented to them 
by agencies participating in The Pitch. Agencies were asked to construct campaign 
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advertisements that would exemplify good political advertising. The work of the pitching 
agencies and the panellists’ critiques provided avenues for the audience to imagine different 
forms of political communication.  
In the first episode, the pitching agencies were asked to produce ‘the perfect candidate 
ad’. The two agencies took different approaches. Melbourne agency Freeform produced an 
advertisement for Tony Abbott that did not feature any concrete policy proposal nor address 
any relevant political issues. The advertisement worked on an emotional level, presenting 
Abbott as a father who wanted to make the world a better place for future generations. Brisbane 
agency Make aimed to overcome the perception that Julia Gillard, as a new leader, was 
‘unknown’ to the public. The advertisement used quotes to reveal her life story and finished 
with the statement that this advertisement would be the only official one Gillard would run. 
Instead of advertisements, she would hold community forums every weeknight on ABC2 as a 
way to guarantee ‘a proper conversation, a proper opportunity to make an informed decision.’ 
The panel of advertising experts (except for Todd Sampson) preferred Freeform’s 
advertisement for its strategy. For instance, Neil Lawrence noted it was ‘a very usable ad’ 
because it ‘humanised Abbott’. Although both Howcroft and Lawrence found the idea of Gillard’s 
community forum ‘laudable’, the Abbott advertisement was judged to be better because ‘there is 
a strategic reason why that might work’ (Howcroft). The attempt of one of the pitching agencies 
to envision a different communication strategy aimed at promoting rational deliberation was 
voted down by the panel applying strategic advertising frameworks in their critique.  
Subsequent Pitch segments followed in a similar vein. In the second episode, agencies 
were asked to make ‘better fear ads’. Despite, in earlier episodes, critiquing the negative effect 
fear advertisements can have on the ‘mandate for leadership’ of particular politicians, the panel 
discerned which of the fear advertisements would be most strategically effective. In the third 
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episode, the participating agencies were asked to come up with advertisements for and against 
The Greens.  When asked to outline their strategic thinking behind the proposed 
advertisements, both agency representatives stressed the importance of featuring policy issues 
in their executions: 
Ben Peacock (Republic of Everyone, Sydney; pro-Greens pitch): The thing about 
The Greens is their biggest asset is their biggest liability. They're known to be 
caring; they're known to stand up for what they believe in. The problem is 
everyone only knows what they believe in is one issue. How do you take all that 
good stuff and show that they actually apply to a whole bunch of issues and 
policies? 
Jim Gall (Redhanded, Melbourne; anti-Greens pitch): We didn't think ‘fear and 
smear’ were going to do it with this campaign. So we opened up a conversation 
with the audience and we wanted to appeal to their intellect. We wanted to look 
at the policy, we wanted them to really discover their policy and understand 
where it could take them. 
The panel’s response to the presented advertisements was overwhelmingly positive. 
Both advertisements were praised for their excellence. But the pro-Greens advertisement came 
out the clear winner, with the panel drawing attention to its emotional appeal and strategic 
concept. Howcroft called it a ‘wonderful, really positive, emotive piece of advertising’, and 
Hewson was taken by ‘the softness and reality of the people in the ad’ and the clever punchline. 
Lawrence also praised it for its ‘really good line’ and the fact that he could ‘see the ad extended 
and other policy issues featured in coming ads’. For Sampson, it was ‘the best ad the Greens 




The panel’s intuitive judgement about the qualities of these advertisements is even 
starker when compared to their critique of an actual campaign advertisement The Greens had 
produced for the election campaign. The panel criticised the advertisement as ‘just an error’ 
(Lawrence) and ‘an awful piece of film’ (Sampson), yet both The Pitch advertisement and the 
actual advertisement featured policy issues. The difference for the panel was the execution of 
the idea in terms of tone and style, as discerned by the advertising experts.  
The Pitch exemplified the way that Gruen Nation panellists appeared to allow for 
alternative visions of political communication but actually constrained this through the use of 
professionally opaque criteria. While some of the pitching agencies tried to envision more 
policy-focused forms of political communication—in the case of Make’s proposed community 
forum in the candidate advertisement for Julia Gillard, for example—the panel always 
determined the better political advertising pitch on the grounds of strategic effectiveness 
embedded in its affective or emotional appeals.  
The Pitch also demonstrated how any mild meta-critique of advertising practices was 
superseded by the celebration of advertising creativity and the effective modulation of the 
audience’s affective responses. For instance, although the panel engaged in a very brief 
normative debate about the downsides of negative campaigning, they tended to celebrate the 
strategic and creative cleverness of some of the negative campaign advertisements. The use of 
traditional forms of advertising, like fear ads, was further legitimised by their inclusion in The 
Pitch challenge. Thus, instead of providing ideas for a different form of political discourse, the 
‘better’ ads of the Gruen Nation pitches were merely variations of well-known advertising 
formulas.  




In her analysis of Australian election reporting, Sally Young (2011, p. 196) argues that ‘meta-
coverage helps journalists reiterate their professional role, demonstrate their distance from 
politicians and explain gaps in their reporting brought about by the effectiveness of political PR’. 
On Gruen Nation we can observe advertising and political communications professionals 
engaged in a similar process. The panellists deployed meta-coverage as a mode of enacting their 
professional identity.  
Savvy forms of meta-coverage like Gruen Nation do not benignly decode or explain the 
role of advertising in the political process. Advertising frameworks have a normative 
connotation; using them to explain the role of advertising in the political process legitimises 
advertising, marketing, branding and public opinion research as legitimate frameworks the 
public might use to understand their participation in the political process. By doing so, 
panellists reflexively inhibit discussion about the impact these modes of communication have 
on the political process itself.  
Through participation in meta-coverage, the panellists on Gruen Nation (just like 
journalists) attempted to construct their professional identity and ideology as a legitimate 
framework for facilitating public dialogue. Rather than simply ‘serving’ the public interest, 
panellists on Gruen Nation legitimised and promoted their professional identity as an integral 
part of the political process. While much attention has been devoted to journalists’ construction 
of journalism as a meaningful and integral part of the political process (Deuze 2006; Schudson 
1978; Tuchman 1979), on Gruen Nation we see panellists reach for their own distinctive 
professional narratives to explain the political process, justify their own role and offer their own 
constructed forms of participation for citizens.  
Perhaps, because of the paradoxical nature of making and managing instrumental forms 
of communication within a liberal-democratic process founded on imagined ideals of 
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participation and deliberation, advertisers struggle to make a legitimate positive account of 
their role. For instance, when Howcroft sincerely claimed that ‘advertising subsidises 
democracy’ the audience laughed—they ‘knew’ it couldn’t be true—and his industry colleague, 
Sampson, cringed.  
Todd Sampson: …the major issue with this election I think is that they have 
officially blurred the line between political advertising and consumer product 
advertising. And I think it’s an awful thing. So spin-doctors, advertising agencies, 
pollsters—they package up these people.  
Russel Howcroft: Hang on, hang on.  
Todd Sampson: Hang on, one second. And it’s terrible to watch smart, intelligent 
people trying to pretend to be something they are not—holding back themselves 
because that does not fit the brand that they’ve packaged up.  
Russel Howcroft: You are not talking about advertising here, you are talking 
about the performance of the leaders.  
Todd Sampson: All of them, all of them.  
Russel Howcroft: No, no. The advertising is very clear. And it is actually very 
honest. The ads are honest in that you know exactly what they are trying to do. 
It’s only when you get the media involved, when you get the spin involved that 
you say ‘I am getting confused here’. There is actually no confusion about the 
advertising.  
Todd Sampson: It’s part of the spin, Russel.  
In a media–political process framed by meta-coverage, the professional communicator 
not only constructs political communication but they also manage how those communication 
strategies are represented.  
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On Gruen Nation, professional ideologies and frameworks of advertising are employed 
to offer an explanation of the political process to ‘ordinary’ people. Advertisers engage in the 
paradoxical activity of explaining to citizens how political communication attempts to 
manipulate them. This rhetoric of participation is not aimed at reforming or critiquing a 
political process increasingly organised around meta-coverage of itself. Instead, it aims only to 
give citizens an understanding of the manipulative and strategic nature of that process. It only 
offers the chance to ‘get off’ on the ‘failure’ of political communication to meaningfully engage 
them as citizens (Andrejevic 2008; Dean 2010). On Gruen Nation this was evident in the 
audience’s frequent laughter at the advertisers’ claims. They appeared to enjoy identifying with 
the insiders who constructed the political communication at which they laughed. The invitation 
to participate by identifying with advertisers, laughing at their attempts to manipulate them, or 
enjoying the feeling of being an expert on how political communication works does not appear 
to lead us towards more creative or constructive communicative practices (Andrejevic 2004; 
Teurling 2010).  
The Gruen Nation audience identifies not only with the professional satirist, like the 
audience of other comedy news programs would, but also with the representatives of the 
industry at which the satire is aimed. The political participation that Gruen Nation invokes 
amplifies the feeling of being privy to how political communication works. This talk reflects 
Graeme Turner’s (2010) critique of a new democratic deficit, where talk of participation 
increases while real participation decreases (also see Andrejevic [2009], Couldry [2010] and 
Hindman [2009]).  
Gruen Nation ends up reflexively celebrating what it sets out to ‘X-ray’. Its ‘bullshit 
detection’ exposes the construction of particular appeals but doesn’t explain the broader 
cultural and political context within which that activity takes place. Furthermore, the 
construction of ‘better’ forms of advertising on The Pitch simply represents and reinforces 
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strategic advertising formulas and judgements. The panel does not reflect on the systemic role 
of advertising and promotion in the political process. Advertising and political communications 
professionals avoid examining how they are caught up in the political process they mobilise 
their professional identity to deconstruct. Howcroft appeared to believe that advertising 
subsidises democracy and that advertising was the only ‘honest’ communication in the 
campaign because ‘you know exactly what they are trying to do’. This version of honesty 
appears grounded not in the substance of what is said, but the ability of the receiver to judge the 
intentions of the communicator. The paradox here is that perhaps if political advertisements 
were ‘actually very honest’ then the public wouldn’t need experts to explain how they work. 
While affective and intuitive judgment is an inevitable part of any mediated communication 
(Street 2004), Gruen Nation appears to amplify intuitive judgments in place of rational and 
critical explanation and deliberation.  
Gruen Nation suggests that everyone from advertising professionals to the public can 
understand and enjoy the constructed appeals of political campaigns. The claim that we have 
‘debunked’ the process of constructing political communications leads us to settle for the claim 
that it is no longer constitutive of our political participation. This serves the advertisers and 
other professional political communicators quite well. By performing an informed critique of 
themselves, they inhabit, maintain and control the spaces where a more thoughtful and 
constructive critique of political communication might emerge. The national broadcaster should 
be applauded for creating innovative ways of engaging the public in the political process 
attuned to the contemporary circulation of politics. But, in doing so, it ought to consider what 
role it plays in reinforcing advertising as both a central part of the democratic process and as a 




1 For academic discussion of television comedy news and news entertainment see Baym 
(2005), Baumgartner and Morris (2006), Feldman (2008), Harrington (2009), Jones (2009), 
Morris (2009), Warner (2007), Young (2008), and Young and Tisinger (2006). 
2 Although neither the producers nor the panellists ever explicitly stated how they would 
define ‘bullshit’ with regard to the subject matter and objectives of the show, it can be 
assumed that the term was supposed to carry normative connotations. A useful reference in 
this context is Harry Frankfurt’s reflection on ‘bullshit’ (2005). ‘For the essence of bullshit is 
not that it is false but that it is phony… This points to a similar and fundamental aspect of 
the essential nature of bullshit: although it is produced without concern for the truth, it need 
not be false. The bullshitter is faking things. But this does not mean he necessarily gets it 
wrong’ (Frankfurt 2005, quoted in Drew, Lyons & Svehla 2010, p. 46). Thus, Frankfurt 
differentiates plain falsehoods from systematic phoniness. In a similar vein, when Gruen 
Nation claimed to be a ‘bullshit detector’ it can be assumed that the show’s objective was to 
analyse and critique the ‘systematic phoniness’ of political communication. 
3 By professional ideology we refer to the narratives that professional communicators employ 
to make their work meaningful to themselves (following Deuze 2006).  
4 A similar debate can also be observed with regard to the impact of ‘celebrity politics’ on the 
political process. In the view of some authors (Postman 1987; Crick 2002; Meyer 2002; 
West & Orman 2002) the way politicians have, over the last decade, engaged with popular 
culture to advance their political goals has impoverished the relationship with the 
electorate. In this account, the rational debate of important issues of public concern has 
been replaced by a focus on irrelevant gestures and superficial appearances. But defenders 
of celebrity politics (Brennan & Hamlin 2000; Corner & Pels 2003; Ankersmit 2002; Street 
2004) see this phenomenon as a logical extension of political marketing that does not 
impoverish but, in fact, strengthen the representative relationship between politicians and 
the audience. According to this position, the affective elements of political communication 
that focus on appearance and style enable citizens to reduce the complexity of political 
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reality and are thereby important and helpful indicators for them to find out what they find 
politically attractive. 
5 The advertising industry is known for its award-consciousness, with more than 240 
international awards and 25 Australasian awards existing (Wells 2011). Some of the awards 
focus on creative craftsmanship, some focus on proven results of the respective advertising 
campaigns (EFFIE; IPA) and some recognise competitiveness within a channel or sector. In 
the case of effectiveness awards, the agencies entering their campaigns into the competition 
have to prove that the advertising was guided by measurable objectives and that evaluation 
after the campaign showed that the effort had at least met these objectives. The vast 
majority of the awards, however, give priority to creativity (AWARD; Melbourne Art 
Directors Club; Caxtons; The One Show; CLIO; International Advertising Festival at Cannes).  
6 Following Andrejevic (2010), Clough (2008) and Massumi (2005) by affect and affective we 
mean the emotive, intuitive and visceral dimensions of perception and communication. 
Affect precedes individual rational perception; it is open-endedly social. We circulate affect 
by virtue of our communicative capacities and place in the social body. We are affective 
labourers when we deploy our linguistic, communicative or intellectual capacities to create 
sociality.  
7 And this is what happened. The Greens wanted to use the ad in their campaign but the ABC 
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